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Etiological Kinds 
 
1. Introduction 
Members of natural kinds are widely considered to share a number of properties.  This is perhaps 
the most minimal condition on natural kinds, and one with which practically everyone writing on 
the topic would agree.  This characterization remains neutral on some crucial questions, such as 
what type of properties need to be shared, why those properties are shared or co-occur, whether 
the properties are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for membership in the kind, whether 
they are shared in every possible world in which the kind exists, and so on.  In particular, this 
characterization does not tell us whether the properties that members of natural kinds share are 
supposed to be intrinsic causal properties (or causal powers), or whether they can consist of 
historical properties, such as a common origin or shared etiology.  Kinds that share historical 
properties are sometimes dubbed “historical kinds” or “etiological kinds” and they have some 
important features that distinguish them from other kinds of kinds.1  Despite the fact that 
etiological kinds are invoked across the sciences, there has been relatively little philosophical 
discussion of their similarities to and differences from synchronic kinds.  In particular, there is 
scant attention in metaphysics and the philosophy of science to the question of whether 
etiological kinds can be natural kinds.  In this paper, I will make an effort to remedy this 
 
1 For reasons that will emerge in due course, I prefer the expression “etiological kind” to 
“historical kind” and will use it throughout this paper.  The expression “etiological kind” is not 
meant to carry a commitment to the claim that etiological kinds are natural kinds, which is a 
claim that will be considered in section 4. 
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situation by providing an account of etiological kinds and their utility for science and by 
considering whether at least some etiological kinds could be natural kinds.  In section 2, I will try 
to characterize the phenomenon of etiological kinds in general terms and will briefly survey 
some previous philosophical discussions of these kinds.  Then, in section 3, I will take a closer 
look at some case studies, which will enable us to take into account various types of etiological 
kinds and compare some of their features.  Finally, in section 4, I will try to understand the 
rationale for classifying on the basis of etiology, putting forward some reasons for the scientific 
interest in classifying phenomena on the basis of diachronic as opposed to synchronic features.  
In so doing, I will make a provisional case for considering at least some etiological kinds to be 
natural kinds. 
 
2. Characterization and Historical Precedents 
One way of characterizing etiological kinds in general terms is as follows: 
An etiological kind is one whose members share a (token or type) causal origin, history, 
or trajectory. 
This characterization immediately gives rise to a distinction between those kinds whose members 
share a token causal origin, history, or trajectory, and those whose members share the same type 
of causal origin, history, or trajectory.2   
 
2 Franklin-Hall (2017) has drawn a distinction between two kinds of historical kinds on this 
basis.  She also puts forward a proposal to explain why scientists individuate historical kinds, 
which I will not have space to discuss here.  In a similar vein, Magnus (2012, 171) has 
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Token-etiological kinds have members that all originate in the very same event, or have 
followed the same token causal trajectory, or share the selfsame history.  One of the most 
extensively discussed cases of this type is that of biological species.  According to a widely 
accepted view of the nature of species, members of a biological species are classified together 
because they are all descended from the same set of common ancestors.  Consequently, they 
have the same token origin and share the same token history.  When it comes to at least some 
(and perhaps all) token-etiological kinds, it seems as though it is open to us not to consider them 
as kinds at all but as individuals.  For example, given that they have relatively well-defined 
spatial and temporal boundaries, some biologists and philosophers of biology propose that 
species should be regarded as individuals, namely “spatiotemporally localized cohesive and 
continuous entities” (Hull 1978, 336; cf. Ghiselin 1974).  On this proposal, what we ordinarily 
think of as members of a species are better conceived as proper parts of individuals.  This 
alternative construal may also be extended to other token-etiological kinds.  Similar points could 
be made about certain social phenomena that can be considered examples of token-etiological 
kinds.  For instance, we can think of Semitic languages as a kind that has as members a number 
of languages that have a single origin in the pre-historic Middle East, namely: Arabic, Hebrew, 
Aramaic, Amharic, and other languages.  But it is also possible to think of this group of 
languages not as discrete individuals belonging to the same kind but as a single historical entity 
originating circa 3800 BCE as a stem language and spreading from southwest Asia into Africa, 
 
distinguished among token and type historical kinds understood as homeostatic property cluster 
kinds. 
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while differentiating and diverging like the branches of a tree.3  It would seem as though it is 
possible to think of token-etiological kinds as individuals rather than as kinds, given that they 
can be identified with a continuous causal-historical process that has definite boundaries in space 
and time.  But since I do not think that conceiving of them as individuals is obligatory, I will 
treat them as kinds for the purposes of this paper. 
As for type-etiological kinds, they do not share the very same token origin or history but 
rather the same type of origin or history.  Their members do not originate in the same event or 
follow the very same causal pathway; rather, their origins or histories are tokens of the same 
type.  For example, in geology, igneous rocks do not all originate from the same source but they 
are created by the same type of process, namely the solidification and crystallization of hot 
magma or lava.  This is a repeatable process in the history of the earth (and perhaps other 
planets) and has occurred a multitude of times, each time producing rocks with the same type of 
origin and causal history.  Igneous rocks are classified as such on the basis of the process that led 
to their formation rather than their intrinsic or synchronic properties. 
The above examples also enable us to introduce another distinction, orthogonal to the 
first, between pure etiological kinds, whose members share nothing but an origin or history, and 
impure or hybrid etiological kinds, whose members share intrinsic or synchronic features too, 
and may be classified into kinds based on both etiological and non-etiological features.  To put it 
 
3 Compare Wylie (1995) on the “demic-diffusion” model that has been put forward to account 
for the distribution of Indo-European languages across western Asia and Europe, which posits a 
steady spread of a population of agriculturalists carrying their language and displacing sister 
languages. 
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more precisely, members of pure etiological kinds do not share any synchronic properties that 
are not also shared with members of other kinds.4  By contrast, members of hybrid etiological 
kinds do not just share diachronic properties, they also share synchronic properties that 
distinguish them from members of other kinds.  These hybrid etiological kinds are no less 
etiological than their pure counterparts, but they are instances of kinds whose members are 
individuated not just in terms of historical properties but additionally on the basis of non-
historical properties.  In these cases, the diachronic mode of classification and the synchronic one 
coincide.  By contrast, pure etiological kinds do not share any synchronic properties that they do 
not also share with members of other kinds.  This distinction can be illustrated using the case of 
biological species, since a common history is not the only thing that members of a biological 
species typically share.  For many species, the ability to interbreed and produce fertile offspring 
is widely held to be criterial for species membership.5  Apart from some extreme 
polymorphisms, members of a given species also often have a loose cluster of intrinsic features 
in common, so biological species are what might be called hybrid (token-) etiological kinds, 
 
4 Members of etiological kinds also belong to some superordinate kind that specifies a broader 
sortal, which often corresponds to a synchronic property that they share with non-members.  For 
example, members of the kind igneous rock are rocks, which is what distinguishes them from 
non-rocks that may share the same causal history.  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for 
pressing me on this point. 
5 In the words of Ernst Mayr (1969, 26): “the members of a species form a reproductive 
community. The individuals of a species of animals recognize each other as potential mates and 
seek each other for the purpose of reproduction.”   
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since they share more than just a history.  By contrast, the class of igneous rocks can be 
considered an example of a pure (type-) etiological kind, since there are no synchronic properties 
(or even a loose cluster of properties) that all igneous rocks have that they do not share with 
other rocks.  They are classified together on the grounds that they have been produced by the 
same type of geological process (as will be shown in section 3).   
So far, I have contrasted etiological kinds with kinds that are individuated on the basis of 
synchronic properties.  It is worth pointing out that synchronic kinds can include kinds 
individuated intrinsically as well as those individuated extrinsically.  In other words, etiological 
kinds are not the only subtype of extrinsic kinds, since there can be extrinsic kinds that are 
synchronic not etiological.6  Functional kinds are also extrinsically or relationally individuated, 
but often synchronically rather than etiologically.  Hence, etiological kinds are individuated (at 
least in part) both extrinsically and diachronically, by contrast with many paradigmatic natural 
kinds, which are individuated on the basis of both intrinsic and synchronic features. 
To gain further insight into the nature of etiological kinds, it will be useful to look briefly 
at a few preceding discussions.  Perhaps one of the earliest attempts to discuss classification on 
historical grounds, can be found in William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.  
Whewell delimits a class of historical sciences, as follows: “…the class of Sciences which I 
designate as Palaetiological are those in which the object is to ascend from the present state of 
things to a more ancient condition from which the present is derived by intelligible causes” 
 
6 The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is notoriously hard to pin down, but 
I’ll assume that something like this distinction is in place for the purposes of this paper.  For 
further discussion, see Langton and Lewis (1998).
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(1847, 637). He explains that he dubs them “palaetiological” on the grounds that they are 
concerned with ancient or historical (paleo-) matters and with causation (etiological), in that 
they classify on the basis of causal history.  Whewell elaborates that these sciences include 
geology, philology, archaeology, and astronomy, though he recognizes that these sciences may 
not be exclusively historical, since (for example) astronomy is concerned not just with etiology 
but with synchronic causal processes as well.7  Nevertheless, he holds that classification in these 
sciences is at least sometimes based on shared history. 
Since Whewell’s seminal treatment, philosophers do not appear to have paid the topic of 
etiological kinds in general much heed, 8 though there has been renewed interest in recent years 
in the historical sciences and in historical explanation in particular (see e.g. Beatty 2006; Cleland 
2011; Ereshefsky and Turner (forthcoming)).  Meanwhile, there has also been a great deal of 
implicit discussion of etiological kinds by philosophers of biology in the course of the extensive 
discussion of the species category, as already suggested.  The classic debate between pheneticists 
and cladists in biological systematics is largely about the virtues of synchronic and etiological 
classification, respectively.  Although pheneticism is sometimes characterized as holding that 
biological organisms ought to be classified based on overall phenotypic or genotypic similarity, 
what would seem to be crucial for pheneticists is an exclusive focus on synchronic rather than 
diachronic features.  Pheneticists assess similarity without regard to lineage or a history of 
descent.  On their view, “biological classifications should be made independent of any 
 
7 Compare Currie (2018), who argues that there may not be a distinct class of “historical 
sciences.” 
8 Two recent exceptions are Magnus (2012, 165-175) and Khalidi (2013, 130-142). 
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theoretical assumptions concerning evolutionary relations” (Ereshefsky 2001, 67).  Cladistic 
classification, on the other hand, is based entirely on the attempt to reconstruct lineages in 
evolutionary history and capture phylogeny.  For cladists, classificatory categories are 
etiological.  These two approaches to classification, synchronic and diachronic, are usually 
regarded as opposing rivals, but some biologists adopt an intermediate position, which takes into 
account both synchronic and diachronic considerations in classification.  Thus, their taxonomic 
categories are hybrid ones.9 
 A less obvious manifestation of the debate between non-etiological and etiological 
classification, and one not derived from biology, can be found in recent philosophy of mind and 
language.  One way of understanding the distinction between “narrow” and “wide” content, and 
the associated debate between semantic internalists and externalists, is as a difference between 
those who would classify contentful mental states on the basis of their synchronic causal powers 
and those who would do so based on their causal history.  Externalists type mental states on earth 
and twin earth differently in the familiar twin-earth scenario based on the fact that earthians and 
twin earthians have picked up the term ‘water’ and the associated concept as a result of (possibly 
indirect) contact with H2O and XYZ, respectively.  This is so, regardless of the fact that the two 
substances would be indistinguishable to the thinkers involved and the behavior of the thinkers 
and their causal powers of identification and discrimination are the same.  Even though 
externalism is often characterized in terms of relations to the natural or social environment, it is 
 
9 For some of the classic papers on the species concept, representing different approaches to 
biological taxonomy, see Ereshefsky (1992).  For more recent contributions on species by 
philosophers and biologists, see Wilson (1999). 
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more properly understood as a thesis about individuation based on etiology.  On most externalist 
accounts, the term ‘water’ as used by an interstellar traveler from earth to twin earth would not 
undergo a change of meaning or reference immediately upon arrival, like an ordinary indexical 
term.  Rather, the traveler would have to have a certain history of contact with XYZ before the 
term ‘water’ would come to refer in their idiolect to XYZ rather than H2O.  The historical or 
etiological individuation of semantic content comes out clearly in a thought experiment first 
broached in Davidson (1987), which has a precursor in Millikan (1984).  Davidson considers a 
case in which a lightning bolt reduces his body to its constituent molecules while it 
simultaneously creates a molecule-for-molecule replica of him from a dead tree in a nearby 
swamp.  According to him, the replica created in the swamp does not mean anything by the 
sounds it makes even though it is indistinguishable from him and no one can tell the difference 
between them.  The reason is that “Swampman” does not have the right causal history, at least at 
the beginning of his career.  As Davidson (1987, 456n.4) goes on to explain, “The Swampman 
simply needs time in which to acquire a causal history that would make sense of the claim that he 
is speaking of, remembering, identifying, or thinking of items in the world.”  This example was 
also taken up in Millikan (1996), where she argued that both ontogeny and phylogeny are 
relevant to a creature’s having thoughts and other mental states.10 
 
10 In earlier work, Millikan (1984, 93; original emphasis) had considered a similar scenario: 
“Suppose that by some cosmic accident a collection of molecules formerly in random motion 
were to coalesce to form your exact physical double… that being would have no ideas, no 
beliefs, no intentions, no aspirations, no fears, and no hopes…. This [is] because the evolutionary 
history of the being would be wrong.” 
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Perhaps the most explicit treatment of etiological kinds in the recent philosophical 
literature occurs in Millikan (1999), where the term “historical kind” appears to make its first 
appearance.  In subsequent work, Millikan (2004, 20-21) associates three features with what she 
calls “historical kinds” or “copied kinds” (she seems to use the terms interchangeably).  First, 
reproduction (or copying): all members have been produced from one another or from the same 
models.  Second, environment: members have been produced by, in, or in response to, the same 
ongoing historical environment, including other copied kinds.  Third, function: some function is 
served by members of the kind, where “function” is roughly an effect raising the probability that 
its cause will be reproduced.  For instance, if organisms perform their function effectively, they 
survive and reproduce, thus raising the probability of the creation of another token of that type.  
Similarly, for artifacts, if a specific model of automobile does its job effectively it raises the 
probability that new instances of that model will be created.  According to Millikan, members of 
these kinds are copied or reproduced precisely because they share certain synchronic features, so 
her “historical kinds” or “copied kinds” are impure or hybrid etiological kinds (in my 
terminology).  Millikan also characterizes them as follows: “The members of these kinds are like 
one another because of certain historical relations they bear to one another… rather than by 
having an eternal essence in common” (1999, 54).  Biological species are the most obvious 
example of Millikan’s copied kinds, but she also includes some kinds of artifact (e.g. 1969 
Plymouth Valiant) and social profession (e.g. doctor) in the class of copied kinds.  In addition to 
being hybrid etiological kinds, I would argue that copied kinds are a distinct subset of etiological 
kinds since they are the result of a particular type of causal process, copying.  Moreover, copied 
kinds would seem to be token-etiological as opposed to type-etiological kinds, since members of 
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copied kinds are all copied from one another or a common blueprint, indicating a token historical 
process.  But as we shall see in section 3, some token-etiological kinds are not copied kinds. 
 
3. Etiological Kinds across the Sciences 
In this section, I will consider a number of examples of etiological kinds drawn from a range of 
different sciences, with a view to clarifying various features of these kinds, including the 
distinctions introduced in the previous section between token- and type-etiological kinds, and 
between pure and hybrid etiological kinds.  A look at some case studies should give us a better 
understanding of the reasons that scientists choose to classify on the basis of history and will also 
help us determine whether some etiological kinds can be considered natural kinds. 
 
3.1. Astronomy and Cosmology 
As recognized by Whewell, there are clear examples of etiological classifications in astronomy 
and cosmology.  Take the kind meteorite in planetary astronomy.  Meteorites are rocks found on 
a planet or moon that originate elsewhere in the universe.  Most meteorites that have been 
investigated by scientists are collected from earth, though some have also been identified on the 
moon and on Mars.  Terrestrial meteorites primarily share an extra-terrestrial origin and they 
have diverse structures and compositions.  Perhaps the only intrinsic property that almost all 
meteorites possess that is not also possessed by non-meteorites is a “fusion crust” on the surface 
of the rock.11  If they are so different in intrinsic properties, why classify them together as 
 
11 “Almost all newly fallen meteorites may be recognized by the presence of a fusion crust. This 
is a layer of 1-3 mm thick that formed during atmospheric flight by the solidification of the melt 
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meteorites?  In short, they all reveal information that enables scientists to reconstruct aspects of 
the history of the solar system and the universe beyond.  Terrestrial meteorites that come from 
other parts of the solar system provide information about the history of the solar system, such as 
“clues to the timing and formation of the planets” (Voosen 2018).  A recent study reports that 
based on isotope levels in different types of meteorites, we can tell that some originated from 
asteroids located near the current location of the asteroid belt, while others came from asteroids 
that were once located near Saturn’s current orbit but were later pushed by the giant planets into 
the current asteroid belt (Nanne et. al. 2019).  This allows scientists to understand better the early 
state of the solar system and the changes in orbits of the planets and the asteroid belt.  Terrestrial 
meteorites are a type-etiological kind, since they share the same type of causal trajectory, having 
all been drawn to earth by the earth’s gravitational field. 
 Another significant etiological kind in astronomy or cosmology is cosmic microwave 
background (CMB) radiation, which is radiation left over from the Big Bang.  It is a form of 
microwave radiation that peaks at 160.23 GHz, whose features indicate that it is a remnant from 
the very earliest stage of the formation of the universe.  Even though instances of CMB radiation 
have common properties in terms of frequency and temperature, what distinguishes CMB is not 
its synchronic properties, since radiation at the same frequency and temperature would not be 
classified as CMB radiation if it did not have the right origin and causal history.  The interest in 
this kind of radiation lies primarily in what it can tell us about the origin of the universe.  CMB 
radiation is considered part of the evidence for the Big Bang and against, for example, the 
 
on the surface when frictional heating ceased as the meteoroid slowed to subsonic velocity.” 
(Hutchison 2004, 13-14) 
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steady-state theory of the universe.  In addition, slight irregularities in the radiation are indicative 
of quantum fluctuations in the distribution of matter in the very early universe.  Unlike meteorite, 
CMB radiation is a token etiological kind, since all its instances have the same origin and an 
identical causal trajectory (at least in the absence of multiple universes).  But despite being a 
token etiological kind, CMB radiation is not a copied kind since it does not result from a copying 
process.  Even though all instances of CMB have identical intrinsic properties, those properties 
do not differentiate them from other instances of radiation with the same frequency and 
temperature, so CMB radiation is also an example of a pure etiological kind.   
 
3.2. Geology 
The basic geological division of rocks into sedimentary, igneous, and metamorphic is a 
classification based on etiology.  As mentioned earlier, igneous rocks are classified as such 
because they are the result of a process of solidification and crystallization of lava or magma.  
Igneous rocks have a range of different compositions and contain a variety of different minerals.  
Their intrinsic properties are extremely variable but their classification as igneous reveals 
something about the geological process by which they were formed.  Many of them contain 
radioactive isotopes that hold clues about their origin and the precise processes that led to their 
formation.  Sedimentary rocks are similarly classified based on their etiology, since they are 
rocks formed when small particles are transported by water, wind, or gravity and deposited in 
one place and later compacted to form larger rocks.  Here again, the intrinsic properties of 
sedimentary rocks can be starkly different, depending on the material from which they are 
formed, the exact processes that led to their formation, and other factors.  Geologists study 
“diagenesis” to ascertain the physical and chemical changes that occur during the conversion of 
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sediment to sedimentary rock.  Based on the structure and composition of sedimentary rocks, 
they can reconstruct their “diagenetic history,” retracing the precise causal pathways that led to 
the formation of sedimentary rocks.  Moreover, stratigraphy is the study of the history of strata 
and its relationship to the geological time scale (Zalasiewicz 2016).  Thus, both of these types of 
rock are classified based on their causal history and the processes that led to their formation, 
even though in both cases, some sub-categories of the categories igneous and sedimentary are 
individuated intrinsically, based on such properties as chemical composition.  Igneous and 
sedimentary rocks are both type-etiological kinds since they are the result of different token 
causal processes of the same type.  They also tend to be pure etiological kinds since there are no 
intrinsic properties that all igneous rocks share or that all sedimentary rocks share that they do 
not also share with members of other kinds.  The only thing that ties them together and sets them 
apart are the causal processes that led to their formation.   
 
3.3. Biology 
As mentioned in section 2, many biologists and philosophers of biology consider biological 
species to be etiological kinds.  They are hybrid token-etiological kinds, since members of a 
species originate from the very same set of ancestors and they typically share a loose cluster of 
properties, notwithstanding some extreme polymorphisms.  Higher phylogenetic taxa (e.g. 
genera, families, etc.) are also classified primarily on basis of descent, but are sometimes 
classified partly on the basis of etiology and partly on the basis of synchronic features.   
Another case of an etiological kind in biology is homology.  At least according to the 
most prevalent conception of homology, homologous phenotypic features derive from the same 
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ancestral structures in different species or higher taxa.12  Homologies are often contrasted with 
analogies (or homoplasies), which are features that share synchronic causal or functional 
properties, despite having different ancestral origins.  The difference between homologous and 
analogous classifications can be understood as a difference between classifying features on the 
basis of historical origin and on the basis of synchronic or functional properties.  Classification 
on the basis of analogous features allows biologists to understand how similar selection pressures 
or environments might give rise to features that perform the same function across different 
lineages, as in convergent evolution.  For example, we might be interested in understanding how 
similar selection pressures gave rise to wings in the lineages of insects, birds, pterosaurs, and 
bats.  Meanwhile, classification on the basis of homology helps scientists explain the evolution 
of phenotypical characters with different features from a single ancestral form.  Comparison of 
three homologous organs, a feline leg, a bat wing, and a dolphin fin, all of which are instances of 
the etiological kind, mammalian forelimb, can help us understand how different selection 
pressures modified a common ancestral form to adapt to different environmental conditions.  
 
12 Ereshefsky (2007) contrasts two main approaches to homology: the taxonomic approach, 
which regards traits as homologous when they are derived from a common ancestor, and the 
developmental approach, which focuses on the ontogeny of traits within and among organisms.  
The account I am assuming here is more closely aligned with the taxonomic approach to 
homology than the developmental.  Brigandt (2002) explicates various different accounts of 
homology in use among biologists and philosophers of biology, including accounts that operate 
at different levels (e.g. genetic, developmental, morphological, and behavioral), emphasizing that 
homology at one level need not translate into homology at another level.   
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Once we know that these organs have a common (token) origin, we acquire a better 
understanding of the specific causal processes that made each of them different from the others 
despite their common origin.13  Homologies are token-etiological kinds that are also copied 
kinds.  It is worth emphasizing that analogies can also be understood as etiological in some 
cases, though the history in question is different from that typically identified when it comes to 
homologies.14  While homologies share the very same ancestral forms and hence a token 
etiology, analogies can in some cases be considered to share a similar type of evolutionary 
history.  Brigandt and Griffiths (2007) point out that analogies have traditionally been considered 
to have a similar function or to have been shaped by natural selection for the same end.  But, as 
emphasized by Love (2007), functional individuation can be synchronic or diachronic.  
Functional anatomists are often interested in synchronic functions, while others may be 
interested in the function for which a feature was selected, which requires an understanding of 
the selection history for that trait (as in the case of wings in different lineages).  Hence, it would 
 
13 Ereshefsky (2012, 391) explains the difference between explanation on the basis of analogy 
and homology: “An analogy explanation for the properties of insect wings explains the features 
needed for performing the function of flight. It explains through design analysis such general 
features as being aerodynamic, being rigid, and being made of a certain range of materials.  By 
contrast, a homology explanation of insect wings explains more specific features of wings by 
citing their morphological, genetic, and ontogenetic sources.  For instance, a homology 
explanation tells us why insect wings are membranous and supported by rigid veins, rather than 
being made of feathers supported by bones.” 
14 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point. 
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be too simplistic to regard homology as etiological and analogy as synchronic, since analogies 
are sometimes individuated with reference to the same type of selection history, making them at 
least in some cases, type-etiological kinds. 
 
3.4. Psychology and Cognitive Science 
As mentioned in section 2, externalism about concepts can be construed as the view that meaning 
and mental content should be individuated etiologically.  In this case, the historical mode of 
individuation and the synchronic can come apart and result in unrelated (wide and narrow) 
mental contents, at least if one is strict about associating mental content with the ultimate cause 
of the relevant mental state.  Some externalists insist that content is determined not by a 
concept’s causal or functional role but by its causal origin.15  On a strict externalist account of 
conceptual content, the content of a concept floats free of its functional role or its associations 
with other concepts and is determined solely by its causal origin.  There are also hybrid accounts 
according to which concepts are individuated at least partly by etiological factors and partly by 
causal powers, or others in which the two modes of individuation are adopted for different 
purposes or in different contexts.  Some philosophers and psychologists are internalists, but 
many would insist that etiology is at least relevant to the individuation of mental content. 
 
15 In this vein, Fodor (1994, 97) writes (adopting the convention of using small caps to stand for 
concepts): “Though DOG-thoughts call up CAT-thoughts, LEASH-thoughts, BONE-thoughts, BARK-
thoughts and the like in most actual mental lives, there are possible mental lives in which that 
very same concept reliably calls up, as it might be, PRIME NUMBER-thoughts or TUESDAY 
AFTERNOON-thoughts or KETCHUP-thoughts.” 
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 Another instance of etiological classification in cognitive science concerns episodic 
memory.  Episodic memories are generally considered to be mental representations of events 
(episodes) in the lifetime of a cognizer.  They are representations of personally experienced past 
events, which are also thought to have a distinctive “autonoetic” phenomenology (Tulving 2002).  
What makes something an episodic memory is commonly held to be (at least partly) the right 
kind of causal link to a particular episode that occurred in the past history of a thinker.  It is 
notoriously difficult to spell out the precise causal condition that needs to be met in order to 
exclude various mundane and bizarre cases (see e.g. Martin and Deutscher 1966; Michaelian 
2011).  Nevertheless, according to many philosophical and psychological accounts of episodic 
memory, what distinguishes memories from other sorts of mental representations (e.g. beliefs, 
imaginations, delusions) is that they originate in a specific past event that is represented in the 
mind-brain of the thinker.16  This connection to history is over and above the etiological 
dimension that externalists insist pertain to concepts.  Even though many memories have 
conceptual content, the etiological aspect that is introduced in virtue of having content is 
additional to the etiology that makes a representation a memory.  For example, I can think the 
thought that dogs are mammals, and if externalists are right, my concept DOG has the content that 
 
16 As a result of recent developments in the psychology and neuroscience of memory, some 
researchers have denied the need for a causal condition when it comes to individuating episodic 
memory, and have called for erasing the distinction between episodic memory and imagination 
or prospective thinking.  I will not try to address their arguments here, but for defenses of this 
view, see, for example, Suddendorf, Addis, and Corballis (2009), De Brigard (2014), and 
Michaelian (2016). 
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it does in virtue of a link to actual instances of dogs.  But I can also entertain a memory about my 
sister’s dog, which is tied to a specific event that occurred last month.  Here, the memory has an 
historical dimension as a result of having conceptual content but it has an added historical 
dimension insofar as it is an episodic memory.  Episodic memories are type- rather than token-
etiological kinds, since they (obviously) do not all have the same causal origin or trajectory.  
What they have in common is the same type of origin and trajectory, the right kind of connection 
to some past experience in the life of the cognitive agent.  They are also often hypothesized to 
have followed the same type of causal trajectory, which involves the cognitive processes of 
encoding, storage, and retrieval.  But specific episodic memories of some common event that 
was personally experienced by numerous people, such as the events of 9/11, could be considered 
token-etiological kinds that have the very same origin.  Their instances are the mental 
representations in the minds of various individual thinkers, which are the individual memories of 
that event. 
 One interesting question when it comes to the individuation of concepts and episodic 
memories has to do with the reasons for classifying them etiologically.  Why do many inquirers 
insist that for something to be a concept of WATER or to be a memory of 9/11, it has to have the 
right history rather than (merely) a certain set of intrinsic features?  When it comes to concepts, it 
seems to have something to do with the need to ground their content in their external 
determinants and trace them back to a referent.  Semantics is usually thought to involve 
correspondence to an extra-mental reality and a causal-historical link to the world is deemed to 
guarantee that correspondence.  As for episodic memories, they are thought to be of a particular 
episode, so unless they have the right kind of connection to that episode they cannot be said to be 
memories of that very episode.  A mental state is not an episodic memory unless it originates in 
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an experience in the history of the individual and is transmitted by an uninterrupted causal chain.  
In both cases, the need for accuracy or validity would seem to justify the etiological mode of 
classification. 
 
4. Why Etiological Kinds? 
After reflecting on the examples discussed in the previous section, two questions might arise.  
The first has to do with whether classification by etiology is justified in science, and if so, on 
what grounds.  The second, more practical, question concerns the viability of such 
classifications, since tracing causal history or origin is a tricky business and, hence, a precarious 
basis on which to build our scientific taxonomies.  In this section, I will try to address the first 
question.  But before doing so, a couple of brief remarks are in order on the second question.  It 
is true that retracing causal pathways is often a fraught endeavor and usually relies on slender 
evidence, but in many domains a range of methods and techniques have been discovered that 
enable scientists to reconstruct a broad variety of phenomena, from the first few minutes after the 
Big Bang to the evolutionary history of our hominid ancestors.  Moreover, scientific and 
technological advances are always improving on our ability to retrace causal pathways and 
recover historical processes based on ephemeral and seemingly insubstantial traces.  There is no 
telling what future techniques will enable us to do when it comes to uncovering historical origins 
and trajectories.17 
 
17 Cleland (2011, 579) writes: “Scientists have become increasingly adept at extracting 
information once thought to be unobtainable from traces of the past.”  For a recent philosophical 
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 As for the question of the justification of etiological categories and the reason for 
classifying phenomena on the basis of causal history, the examples in the previous section 
provide us with an appreciation of the variety and diversity of etiological kinds and perhaps a 
better understanding of the point of such classifications.  Based on this brief survey, it would 
seem as though there are broadly three reasons for etiological classifications:   
(a) Retrodiction (i.e. prediction of the past): When we classify something into an etiological 
category, this enables us to make a retrodiction about its past.  For instance, if we identify a rock 
as a meteorite based on its fusion crust, we can infer that it had an extra-terrestrial origin and a 
certain causal trajectory through the earth’s atmosphere. 
(b) Explanation: Classification in an etiological category can help us understand and explain the 
causal processes that led to its current state.  For instance, classifying two phenotypic features as 
homologues can help us explain how certain selection pressures led to their current forms, as 
with a bat wing that is classified as a homologue of a feline forelimb. 
(c) Tracking accuracy or validity: Classification according to etiology is sometimes in the 
service of securing an accurate representation of a past event, or indeed ensuring that a current 
phenomenon bears a mark or trace of some previous state of affairs.  For instance, a mental state 
is classified as an episodic memory based on a connection to a past event and a mental 
representation is classified as a concept of WATER based on a presumed link to samples of H2O. 
Do these reasons vindicate the use of etiological categories in science?  Can they provide 
a justification for etiological classification?  In the first two cases, etiological categories serve 
 
treatment of the historical sciences that emphasizes the feasibility of uncovering evidence for 
theories about the past, see Currie (2018). 
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standard scientific goals of prediction and explanation.  At least prima facie, etiological 
categories seem to be on a par with other scientific categories in this regard.  Moreover, these 
two reasons align with features commonly associated with natural kind categories, namely that 
they enable explanation and prediction.  As for the third reason, securing the accuracy or validity 
of a representation may also seem to conform with the scientific aim of truthful description.  But 
when it comes to concepts and episodic memories, the representations in question are not those 
of the scientific observers but those of the agents being studied.  If cognitive scientists classify a 
thinker’s mental representation as a concept of WATER based on its causal link to H2O, this is not 
done in the service of providing an accurate description of chemical phenomena, since cognitive 
scientists are in the business of describing (and explaining, predicting, and so on) the minds of 
thinkers, not the microstructures of chemical substances.  Moreover, it is not obvious that 
describing it as a concept of WATER better helps to explain and predict the thinker’s actions.18  
Still, here too, it seems that the overriding purpose is the need to retrace and understand causal 
pathways, which is often considered to be the ultimate aim of science: to capture the causal 
structure of the world. 
It is worth pausing here to consider whether these reasons for etiological classification 
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  They would seem to be distinct reasons, despite the fact 
that the aims of retrodiction and tracking accuracy or validity are closely related.19  Both of them 
 
18 There is, of course, a heated philosophical debate about whether wide or narrow content 
should be the mode of individuation adopted by scientific psychology and cognitive science, 
which I do not have space to tackle here. 
19 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for separately raising this issue. 
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involve classifying particulars on the basis of etiology for the purpose of ascertaining something 
about their origin.  But the need to reconstruct origins seems differently motivated in the two 
cases.  One way of bringing out the difference is by comparing them to certain etiological kinds 
in the social sciences.  At least some properties and kinds in the social sciences appear to be 
etiological but not merely because of an interest in retrodiction.  For instance, something is not 
an instance of the kind money unless it has the right provenance, and something is not an 
exemplar of the kind law unless it has been enacted or passed by the proper authority or 
according to the correct procedures.  But in classifying particulars as money or law on these 
grounds, we are not just interested in retrodiction.  When we classify particulars into these 
categories, the point is not merely to retrodict that a particular token of money originated in a 
certain mint or a particular statute was issued by the relevant legislative body.  Rather, in both 
cases we do so in order to be assured of authenticity or genuineness.  In some respects, those 
who individuate concept or episodic memory etiologically are acceding to the same need for 
authenticity.  In the social world, we often have an interest in individuating according to history 
or origin because we need to be assured that members of the kind are what they purport to be.  In 
such cases, what is at issue is not just retrodiction but the need to ensure that a phenomenon 
bears the trace of a previous state of affairs.  Distinguishing between a memory and an 
imagination has something in common with differentiating genuine money from counterfeit 
currency, a commonality that goes beyond differentiating a meteorite from a terrestrial rock.  
That is why the first and third reasons for etiological classification seem distinct, even though 
retrodiction may be a necessary condition for tracking accuracy or validity.  As for these reasons 
being exhaustive, I will not try to make the case that there are no other grounds for etiological 
individuation.  The three reasons outlined above seem to account for the examples considered 
 25 
here, but it is an open question whether there are other reasons for diachronic classification and 
for identifying etiological kinds. 
Can etiological kinds be natural kinds?  The answer to this question obviously depends 
on one’s conception of natural kinds, but I think there is room for accommodating them on the 
prevailing contemporary accounts.  Recent theories of natural kinds split roughly into two 
groups, essentialist and naturalist.  Essentialists consider natural kinds to be characterized by 
essences, properties that are necessary and sufficient for kind membership and are modally 
necessary or shared across all possible worlds.  Some essentialist philosophers have also insisted 
that essences must be intrinsic and that they cannot consist of relational or historical properties.  
For example, Ellis (2001, 20) holds that “… the distinctions between natural kinds must be based 
on intrinsic differences.”  On such a conception of natural kinds, etiological kinds would be ruled 
out.  But other essentialists disagree, explicitly defending origin essentialism for biological 
species (e.g. Griffiths 1999; Okasha 2002).  This would allow etiological kinds that are based on 
causal origin and, as long as individuating causal histories and trajectories is not problematic, 
other etiological kinds as well.   In the absence of a clear argument for ruling out kinds with 
historical essences, there does not seem to be a principled obstacle to allowing etiological kinds 
to be natural kinds on an essentialist construal.  Essentialist accounts of natural kinds have 
recently been challenged by accounts that do not insist on linking natural kinds to sets of 
necessary and sufficient properties and are at best agnostic about the modal claims associated 
with essentialism.  Such accounts of natural kinds can be considered “naturalist,” in the sense 
that they maintain that the categories of established scientific theories are our most reliable guide 
to the kinds that exist in the universe (see Boyd 1999a; Kornblith 1993; Magnus 2012; Khalidi 
2013).  The fact that the etiological kinds discussed in previous sections play a role in the central 
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endeavors of science, including explaining and predicting important features of the world, should 
lead one to surmise that they are good candidates for being natural kinds.  Moreover, many such 
naturalist accounts emphasize causality and consider that scientific categories aim to discern the 
causal structure of reality.  This emphasis on causation is prominent in Boyd’s account of natural 
kinds and it is exemplified in what he calls the “accommodation thesis”: “Kinds useful for 
induction or explanation must always ‘cut the world at its joints’ in this sense: successful 
induction and explanation always require that we accommodate our categories to the causal 
structure of the world” (1991, 139).  Boyd also writes of “the accommodation of inferential 
practices to relevant causal structures” (1999b, 56).  This is also a central feature of Kornblith’s 
account of natural kinds: “It is precisely because the world has the causal structure required for 
the existence of natural kinds that inductive knowledge is even possible” (1993, 35).   If 
etiological kinds are individuated on the basis of their (token or type) causal origin, history, or 
trajectory, they should enable us to better describe the causal structure of the world, and they 
would thereby qualify as candidates for natural kinds on this naturalist understanding. 
Before concluding that etiological kinds correspond to bona fide scientific categories and 
may therefore be viable candidates for natural kinds in a range of different domains, it is 
necessary to consider two objections to this claim.  The first objection is not aimed at historical 
or etiological properties in particular, but at relational properties and kinds in general.  Since 
etiological properties and kinds are relational, any defender of them must address the objection.  
Some philosophers have expressed the opinion that relational or non-intrinsic kinds cannot be 
natural kinds and have no place in a mature science.  For example, Fodor (1987, 45) once held 
that individualism “is a constitutive principle of science” and claimed that planet is not a 
scientific kind since it is individuated relationally rather than intrinsically.  Additionally, in the 
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context of cognitive science, some philosophers have invoked the principle of “methodological 
solipsism” or “individualism” namely that the individuation of mental types ought always to be 
based on intrinsic features of the individual cognitive agent, rather than extrinsic or historical 
features.  Calling a closely related claim the “Autonomy Principle,” Stich (1991, 239) expresses 
this idea as follows: “any state or property properly invoked in a psychological explanation 
should supervene on the current, internal, physical state of the organism.”  Although some 
philosophers have dissented from this position, for many others, it represents a basic 
metaphysical claim about the workings of the human mind (as well as other natural phenomena).  
The thought is that intrinsic causal powers are what do the causing, and hence they are the only 
properties that will show up in a science of the mind (and indeed in any complete science). 
 To answer this objection, it must first be acknowledged that etiological properties and 
kinds are not causally efficacious in the sense that they do not actually do the “pushing and 
pulling” in our universe.  If a material object belongs to the kind sedimentary rock, that does not 
thereby imply that it is endowed with any specific causal powers.  By contrast, if it belongs to the 
kind limestone then we know that it is composed of calcium carbonate and is disposed to react 
with acids to release carbon dioxide, among other things.  Similarly, a rock’s being a meteorite 
does not give it a tendency to participate in any specific causal interactions, whereas its being 
composed of iron does.  Classification of something as a sedimentary rock or a meteorite tells us 
what kinds of processes have given rise to these objects and how they have come to have the 
(possibly diverse) properties that they have, not what they will go on to do.  By their very nature, 
etiological or historical properties are primarily backward-looking not forward-looking.  Yet, in 
both these cases and in the other cases surveyed, that does not mean that these classifications do 
not have scientific importance nor that they lack metaphysical significance.  Their diachronic 
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properties often serve as a guide or indicator for what will occur in the present and future.  For 
instance, when it comes to kinds that are individuated for the purpose of tracking validity or 
accuracy, this can be a guide to future performance.20  If an organism’s memories are 
distinguished from other mental states on the grounds that they track past occurrences, this can 
serve as a guide that states of the same kind will do so in the future.  Also, as already mentioned, 
these classifications can be both retrodictive and explanatory.  For example, if we want to 
explain why a certain rock found in the desert has a fusion crust (that is, a thin surface layer of 
solidified molten rock), we can cite the fact that it is a meteorite.  Now someone might say that 
this is not a satisfactory explanation, since the real explanation is that the rock travelled rapidly 
through the earth’s atmosphere, slowing gradually to subsonic velocity.  An objector might 
continue by saying that a causal explanation of the fusion crust would cite the velocity of the 
rock, its material composition, the properties of the atmosphere, and so on, all of which are 
synchronic, intrinsic properties of the relevant entities.  But it would be unreasonable to deny 
that in certain contexts, a satisfactory explanation of the rock’s fusion crust would cite the fact 
that it is a meteorite.  This explanation seems to conform to a type of historical explanation 
recently identified by Cleland (2011, 554), who has analyzed a pattern of explanation in the 
historical sciences characterized by two interrelated stages: (i) the proliferation of multiple 
competing hypotheses to explain a puzzling body of traces encountered in fieldwork, and (ii) a 
search for a ‘smoking gun’ to discriminate among them.21  If we consider the fusion crust on the 
 
20 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making this point. 
21 For other recent accounts of historical or narrative explanation that cite historical or etiological 
kinds, see Currie and Sterelny (2017) and Ereshefsky and Turner (forthcoming). 
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surface of the rock to constitute the puzzling trace in this case, we might posit a number of 
different ways of accounting for it, for example: erosion, melting as a result of being subject to 
high temperatures in the earth’s mantle, and passage through the earth’s atmosphere.  But based 
on the location of the rock, surrounding geological formations, the specific features of the fusion 
crust, and other factors (all of which can be considered ‘smoking guns’), we might infer that the 
last hypothesis is the most plausible, thereby concluding that the rock is a meteorite.  When we 
explain a rock’s fusion crust by citing the fact that it is a meteorite, we have successfully 
accounted for some aspects of its current state.  It is true that the explanation only explains 
against a background of additional information about what meteorites are, that is, on what basis 
they are classified as such.  But all explanations are incomplete or enthymematic, including the 
synchronic causal explanation for the existence of the fusion crust, which keeps in the 
background certain facts about the heating effects of friction, the reason that the rock does not 
disintegrate on encountering the earth’s atmosphere, the reason that the rock does not orbit earth 
on experiencing its gravitational pull, and so on.   
 In claiming that etiological properties and kinds can be explanatory, I have embraced an 
account of explanation that is ecumenical and allows for other kinds of explanation besides 
synchronic-causal explanations.  But it bears emphasizing that etiological kinds are also causally 
grounded, even though they cite backward-looking rather than forward-looking causes.  That is, 
they refer to the causal origin or pathway that gave rise to the phenomenon in question.  To 
repeat, if we are interested in describing and understanding the causal structure of the world, then 
we cannot afford not to identify etiological kinds.  Here, a new objection might arise, to the 
effect that it is one thing to reconstruct causal history and quite another to regard entities that 
have the same (type or token) etiology as belonging to the same kinds.  This objection might 
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continue by saying that one can reconstruct the relevant causal pathways without positing the 
existence of etiological kinds.  The problem with this objection is that it is unclear how one can 
retain the explanations and retrodictions without deploying general terms (e.g. in the claim: 
“(almost) all meteorites have a fusion crust as a result of travelling through the earth’s 
atmosphere”).  Moreover, if we need to use a general category to apply to all phenomena covered 
by a certain explanation then that prima facie carries an ontological commitment to the class of 
phenomena picked out by the category.  At least from a naturalist perspective, natural kinds 
correspond to the general categories of our considered scientific theories, and when those 
categories are explanatory and otherwise further the aims of science, it would be perverse to 
deny that the corresponding kinds are at least potential candidates for natural kinds. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has introduced a neglected kind of scientific kind, etiological kinds.  After 
characterizing these kinds and proposing some distinctions among them (token- and type-
etiological kinds, and pure and hybrid etiological kinds), I briefly considered several case studies 
drawn from: astronomy and cosmology, geology, biology, and psychology and cognitive science.  
This survey is hardly comprehensive, but it comprises a diverse group of etiological kinds from a 
range of scientific disciplines.  Accordingly, I put forward some reasons for identifying them in 
science and argued that there are good grounds for thinking that at least some etiological kinds 
are good candidates for natural kinds.  Though they are individuated with reference to diachronic 
factors rather than synchronic causal powers, I argued that etiological kinds are nevertheless 
associated with the project of understanding the causal structure of the world. 
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